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Abstract 
Commercial network security solutions are typically measured by the throughput of the 
device in megabytes per second. Throughput is also quite often used to compare the 
different vendors and to size the security solution so that the solution is able to handle the 
network traffic passing through. 
One method of avoiding a network security solution is to overwhelm the solution with 
excessive network traffic so that it either crashes or starts to bypass the traffic from the 
proper inspection. In a situation like this, more information about the performance of the 
solution would be extremely crucial.    
The goal was to investigate the behavior of the security features, especially intrusion 
prevention systems, in high load situations. The target systems were loaded with high traffic 
volume using Ixia's BreakingPoint tool, and the Attack Pack feature of the tool was used to 
evaluate the security capabilities under the load. The difference between low and high load 
situations was also observed.  
The results of the research revealed that different security solutions performed quite 
differently under heavy load. Additionally, it was noted that the measurement of the 
capabilities of a security product is not as straightforward as it might sound and comparing 
the results between different solutions poses a significant challenge. 
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Kaupallisia tietoverkkoihin suunniteltuja tietoturvakomponentteja vertaillaan tyypillisesti 
keskenään käyttäen laitteen tai tuotteen läpäisykykyä vertailtavana suureena. Läpäisykyky 
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Yksi tapa ohittaa tietoverkkoihin suunnatut tietoturvakomponentit on suunnata laitetta 
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kyvykkyyksien tai suorituskyvyn mittaaminen on erittäin haastavaa ja yhteneväisten 
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1 Introduction 
The purpose of the thesis is to investigate if the intrusion prevention solutions 
available on the market are able to detect and drop malicious traffic in high load 
scenarios. Ixia BreakingPoint test tool was used to test the commercial security 
solutions which house an intrusion prevention system. 
1.1 Thesis background 
Introduced over a decade ago, the first network intrusion prevention systems (IPS) 
were built on generic Intel servers with the purpose of blocking exploits that target 
vulnerable servers. Soon after, attacks against desktop clients emerged and the first 
generation of intrusion prevention struggled to maintain performance and security. 
This led to a new hardware-accelerated generation of IPS that could inspect much 
more traffic and at higher speeds than software-only solutions. (NSS Labs 2017, 4) 
Firewall technology is one of the largest and most mature security markets. Firewalls 
have undergone several stages of development, from early packet filtering and 
circuit relay firewalls to application layer (proxy-based) and dynamic packet filtering 
firewalls. Throughout their history, however, the goal has been to enforce an access 
control policy between two networks, and they should therefore be viewed as an 
implementation of policy. (NSS Labs 2016, 5) 
A firewall is a mechanism used to protect a trusted network from an untrusted 
network, while allowing authorized communications to pass from one side to the 
other, thus facilitating secure business use of the Internet. With the emergence of 
new web applications and security threats, however, firewalls are evolving further. 
Next generation firewalls (NGFWs) traditionally have been deployed to defend the 
network on the edge, enterprises have expanded deployment options to include 
internal segmentation. (NSS Labs 2016, 5) 
These security solutions are the backbone of the network security in most of the 
networks, which makes them an extremely critical point in the network and sets 
quite high standards when it comes to performance and reliability.  
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1.2 Research problem  
Commercial network security solutions are typically measured by the throughput of 
the device in megabytes per second. Additionally, throughput is quite often used to 
compare the different vendors and to size the security solution so that the solution is 
able to handle the network traffic passing through.  
One method of avoiding a network security solution is to overwhelm the solution 
with excessive network traffic so that it either crashes or starts to bypass the traffic 
from the proper inspection. In a situation like this, more information about the 
performance of the solution would be extremely crucial.    
The objective of this research is to study how the handling of the malicious traffic is 
performed when the security solution is experiencing a very high load. Currently, 
benchmarking providers such as NSS Labs perform under-load tests so that the 
overall system load of the solution under test is about 80% of the maximum. 
1.3 Research methods and challenges  
The primary objective in the research was to study how the handling of malicious 
traffic in the different intrusion prevention systems, either embedded into a security 
solution such as a next generation firewall or as a standalone system such as Snort, is 
performed when the system load is over 90%.  
The research aims to compare the amount of malicious traffic propagating through 
the tested system in normal and high load situations. 
Before the implementation phase it was unknown if the target devices can be taxed 
up to 90% of the overall system capacity. Additionally, the full functionality of the 
tool used for testing could not be confirmed before the actual implementation 
phase. To avoid problems with the testing, following decisions were made: 
• Hardware devices under the test were low end devices with minimal intrusion 
prevention performance. 
 
• Virtual devices were only given minimum amount of CPU power. 
 
• The test environment should be able to utilize 1 Gigabit traffic volume. 
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A case study type of approach was selected as the research method as it is a method 
used to narrow down a very broad field of research into one easily researchable 
topic. (Shuttleworth, M. 2008) 
A mix of qualitative and quantitative research is also included as the results are to 
consist of measurable data such as the performance numbers of IPS systems and 
non-measurable information such as the behavior of the devices under high load. 
2 IDS and IPS  
Intrusion detection and prevention systems are security controls designed to monitor 
network traffic and to filter the malicious traffic off from the network. These systems 
can be used as a separate device in the network or as an integrated part of a security 
platform like a firewall. 
2.1 History and development of IPS 
Both of these systems have their actual roots in auditing as in 1980, James Anderson 
wrote a technical report called Computer Security Threat Monitoring and 
Surveillance for the U.S. Air Force. The paper showed that audit records could be 
used to help identify computer misuse and identify threat classifications, and it 
offered suggestions to improve auditing of systems to identify misuse. (Trost 2009) 
The older of these two systems, IDS was developed heavily during 1980s and 1990s. 
The first IPS systems started to emerge in the late 1990s, most notably SNORT, an 
open source libpcap-based packet sniffer and logger, developed by Marty Roesch, 
which is today the de-facto standard in intrusion prevention.  
The main difference between an intrusion detection system and intrusion prevention 
system is that the intrusion prevention system is able to drop or modify the traffic 
passing through.  
2.2 IDS 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a security control or countermeasure that has 
the capability to detect misuse and abuse of, and unauthorized access to, network 
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resources (Adesina, Barker & Burns 2012). Intrusion detection systems do not take 
any action when malicious traffic is seen in the network. Figure 1 presents a typical 
IDS deployment scenario. 
 
 
Figure 1 Example IDS deployment 
An IDS needs only to detect threats and as such is placed out-of-band on the network 
infrastructure, meaning that it is not in the true real-time communication path 
between the sender and receiver of information. Rather, IDS solutions will often take 
advantage of a TAP or SPAN port to analyze a copy of the inline traffic stream (and 
thus ensuring that IDS does not impact inline network performance). (Palo Alto 
Networks 2017) 
IDS was originally developed this way because at the time, the depth of analysis 
required for intrusion detection could not be performed at a speed that could keep 
pace with components on the direct communications path of the network 
infrastructure. (Palo Alto Networks 2017)  
2.3 IPS 
A security control or countermeasure that has the capability to detect and prevent 
misuse and abuse of, and unauthorized access to, networked resources is an 
intrusion prevention system. (Adesina et al. 2012) 
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The main capability provided by Network Intrusion Prevention is the ability to 
prevent malicious traffic from reaching the target system (Hogue & Carter 2006). 
Figure 2 presents an IPS deployment scenario. 
 
Figure 2 Example IPS deployment 
A wide number of platforms can host an IPS. IPS can be deployed as a dedicated 
appliance or in a combination with other security controls such as stateful packet 
filtering as deployed in a firewall. IPSs can also be found in host computers usually as 
a part of the endpoint protection suite products.  
IPS was originally built and released as a standalone device in the mid-2000s. This, 
however, was in the advent of today’s implementations, which are now commonly 
integrated into Unified Threat Management (UTM) solutions (for small and medium 
size companies) and next-generation firewalls (at the enterprise level). (Palo Alto 
Networks 2017) 
Modern wireless networks can also house an IPS system capable of defeating attacks 
targeted against wireless users. 
Network Intrusion Prevention provides a proactive component that effectively 
integrates into overall network security framework. Combining Network Intrusion 
Prevention with other security components, such as a Host Intrusion Prevention 
System (HIPS), an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), and perimeter firewalls, provides 
a robust defense-in-depth network security solution. (Hogue & Carter 2006) 
Network IPS operates at layer three and four of the Open systems interconnect 
model. A network IPS has four main features: (Adesina et al. 2012)  
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A network IPS can detect attacks on several different types of operating systems and 
applications, depending on the extent of its database. 
1. A single device can analyze traffic for a large scale of hosts on the network, 
which makes network IPSs a cost-effective solution that decreases the cost of 
maintenance and deployment. 
2. As sensors observe events from and to various hosts and different parts of 
the network, they can correlate the events, hosts, and networks to higher-
level information. In conjunction with the correlation, they can obtain deeper 
knowledge of malicious activity and act accordingly. 
3. A network IPS can remain invisible to the attacker through a dedicated 
interface that monitors only network traffic and is unresponsive to various 
triggers or stimuli. 
There are three types of approaches how the network IPSs are investigating the 
traffic passing through: signature based, anomaly based and policy based approach.  
A network IPS that analyzes network traffic and compares the data in the flow 
against a database of known attack signatures is called signature-based IPS. A 
signature-based IPS looks at the packet headers and/or data payloads when 
analyzing network traffic. All signature-based IPSs require regular updates for their 
signature databases. (Adesina, et al. 2012) 
A network IPS that analyzes or observes network traffic and acts if a network event 
outside normal network behavior is detected is called anomaly-based IPS. The two 
types of anomaly-based network IPSs are statistical anomaly detection and protocol 
verification. (ibid) 
A network IPS that analyzes traffic and acts if it detects a network event outside a 
traffic policy is called policy based IPS. A traffic policy usually involves permitted or 
denied communications over a network segment similar to an enterprise-class 
firewall (ibid). Figure 3 shows a Cisco network IPS management console. 
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Figure 3 Cisco Firepower Management Center 
Another form of intrusion prevention is the host IPS (HIPS). Often referred to as 
endpoint security controls, a HIPS consists of operating system security controls or 
security agent software installed on hosts that can include desktops PCs, laptops, or 
servers. Host IPSs in most cases extend the native security controls protecting an 
operating system or its applications (Adesina, et al. 2012). 
F-secure SAFE or Sophos endpoint security are good examples of an endpoint 
protection suite which also incorporates host IPS. Figure 4 shows an advanced HIPS 
solution. Figure 4 shows an example of a host based IPS solution. 
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Figure 4 Sophos HIDS root cause analysis (www.sophos.com) 
A Wireless IPS (WIPS) solution can be found on almost every commercial wireless 
solution on the market. However, the capabilities of the IPSs vary a great deal from 
simple rogue access point detection to active jamming of the rogue access points. 
The main capabilities of a wireless IPS are rogue detection, wired containment and 
wireless containment.  
In rogue detection, the is few different methods for determining that an access point 
is connected to the wire. The most basic is a +/- 1MAC address check of traffic that 
has been on the wire and seen wirelessly. If wired traffic is observed with a MAC 
address that is within 1 of wireless traffic, that device will be tagged as a wired 
connected rogue. (Aruba Networks 2014) 
Wired containment is performed by ARP poisoning the default gateway of a rogue 
device connected to the wire. The detecting AP or AM will perform the containment. 
The wirelessly detecting device needs to be on the same VLAN as the rogue for the 
wired containment to be successful. (Aruba Networks 2014) 
There are two types of wireless containment, deauth and tarpitting. Both start out 
the same way. The access point will send de-authentication packets to the access 
point and the client device. Most client devices will automatically try to reconnect to 
the network. When deauth is selected, the access point will send another deauth 
packet once the client is connected to the network. With modern clients that can 
13 
 
 
happen as quickly as every 15 milliseconds. Tar-pitting will behave a little differently. 
When the client device attempts to reconnect to the network, the access point will 
respond with a probe response that has some fake data in it to induce the client 
device to connect to the access point rather than the rogue device. The client device 
then takes some time to realize the connection isn’t going anywhere. At that point, it 
disconnects and starts over. (Aruba Networks 2014) 
3 IPS terminology  
Security controls in IPS systems detect and produce alerts from a number of factors. 
Security controls are divided into a four-different situation category by the type of 
the detection.  A detection can be, for example, from a legitimate malicious traffic or 
from a misconfiguration of an IPS system.  
3.1 Security controls 
IPS security controls are situations which describes how alarm or response against 
detection is classified. Security controls are classified in one of the following terms: 
(Adesina, et al. 2012) 
True positive 
A situation in which a signature fires correctly when intrusive traffic for that 
signature is detected on the network. The signature correctly identifies an attack 
against the network. This represents normal and optimal operation. (Adesina, et al. 
2012) 
False positive 
A situation in which normal user activity triggers an alarm or response. This is a 
consequence of non-malicious activity. This represents an error and generally is 
caused by excessively tight proactive controls or excessively relaxed reactive 
controls. (Adesina, et al. 2012) 
True negative 
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A situation in which a signature does not fire during normal user traffic on the 
network. The security control has not acted and there was no malicious activity. This 
represents normal and optimal operation. (Adesina, et al. 2012) 
False negative 
A situation in which a detection system fails to detect intrusive traffic although there 
is a signature designed to catch the activity. In this situation, there was malicious 
activity, but the security control did not act. This represents an error and generally is 
caused by excessively relaxed proactive controls or excessively tight reactive 
controls. (Adesina, et al. 2012) Table 1 summarises IPS action situations.  
 
Table 1 IPS Signature summary 
 POSITIVE NEGATIVE 
TRUE 
True Positive: 
Alerted on intrusion 
attemp 
True Negative: 
Not alerted on benign activity 
FALSE 
False Positive: 
Alerted on benign activity 
False Negative: 
Not alerted on intrusion attemp 
 
3.2 Signatures 
All IPS products use signatures. Signatures are the means of an IPS to prevent the 
malicious activities, where it is happening on a host or in a network.  Simply put IPS 
signature is any distinctive characteristic that identifies something. (Hogue & Carter 
2006) 
IPS Signatures can be distinguished by signature type, action or trigger. Signatures 
fall into one of the following two basic categories depending on their 
functionality.(ibid.) 
3.2.1 Atomic Signatures 
Atomic signatures represent the simplest signature type. For an atomic signature, a 
single packet, activity, or event is examined to determine if the signature should 
trigger a signature action. Because these signatures trigger on a single event, they do 
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not require intrusion system to maintain state. The entire inspection can be 
accomplished in an atomic operation that does not require any knowledge of past or 
future activities. (Hogue & Carter 2006) 
State refers to situations in which you need to analyze multiple pieces of information 
that are not available at the same time. It also refers to tracking established TCP 
connections (connections that have gone through the initial three-way handshake). 
Valid TCP traffic also refers to traffic that has the correct sequence numbers for an 
established connection. For Network IPSs, state signatures usually refer to signatures 
that require analyzing traffic from multiple packets. (ibid.) 
A good example of a network based atomic signature is ARP (address resolution 
protocol) spoofing attack. This attack can be detected by inspecting a single packet 
and as everything is contained in a single packet, no state information is needed to 
identify the attack.  
An ARP spoofing attack is an attack where an attacker floods a network with spoofed 
ARP information in order to divert the traffic destined to the network’s default 
gateway to attacker.  
3.2.2 Statefull signatures 
Unlike atomic signatures, stateful signatures trigger on a sequence of specific events 
that requires the IPS device to maintain state. The length of time that the signatures 
must maintain state is known as the event horizon. Configuring the length of the 
event horizon is a tradeoff between consuming system resources and being able to 
detect an attack that occurs over a long period of time. (Hogue & Carter 2006) 
Stateful signatures usually require several pieces of data to match an attack 
signature. The maximum amount of time over which an attack signature can 
successfully be detected (from the initial data piece to the final data piece needed to 
complete the attack signature) is known as the event horizon. The intrusion system 
must maintain state information for the duration of the event horizon. The length of 
event horizon varies from one signature to another. (ibid.) 
Often, Network-based IPS signatures are stateful signatures because the information 
needed can usually be distributed across multiple packets. Even a simple string 
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match signature is usually stateful because the string can occur across multiple 
packets (because the IPS must examine the data from all the packets until the 
successful match is made). For example, if you want to search for the string 
/etc/password in an HTTP URL, you might have to check multiple packets because 
the string can be distributed across more than one packet. (Hogue & Carter 2006) 
3.3 Signature triggers 
The heart of any IPS signature is the mechanism that causes it to trigger. These 
triggering mechanisms can be simple or complex, and every IPS incorporates 
signatures that use one or more of these basic triggering mechanisms to trigger 
signature actions. These triggering mechanisms can be applied to both atomic and 
stateful signatures. (ibid.) 
The most commonly used triggering mechanisms today are pattern detection, 
anomaly-based detection and behavior based detection. 
The simplest triggering mechanism is identifying a specific pattern. This pattern can 
represent a textual or binary string or it can be other pattern, such as a sequence of 
function calls. (ibid.) 
Regular expression (REGEX) patterns are the most commonly used type of a pattern 
detection.  Specifying string patterns using regex provides the ability to efficiently 
search for textual patterns (using a single regular expression) while making it harder 
to bypass the pattern without detection. (ibid.) 
For example, the following regex string searches for an attempt to change the 
working directory to the root directory during an FTP session (Hogue & Carter 2006):  
[ \t]*[Cc][Ww][Dd][ \t]+[~]root 
Anomaly-based (also known as profile-based detection) signatures are not based on 
a specific event. Instead. these signatures trigger when a certain activity deviates 
from what is considered normal. 
In order to utilize anomaly based detection, a certain baseline must be established. 
In other words, the baseline refers to what is normal and everything outside that 
scope can be flagged as anomaly. 
17 
 
 
Behavior-based detection is similar to pattern detection, but instead of trying to 
define specific patterns, you are defining behaviors that are suspicious based on 
historical analysis. The behaviors define classes of activity that are known to be 
suspicious. (Hogue & Carter 2006) 
3.3.1 Considerations 
Hogue & Carter (2006) state that “one drawback with atomic signatures is that you 
have to know all the atomic events that you want to look for. For each of these 
events, you then have to create the appropriate signature. As the number of atomic 
signatures increases, just managing the different signatures can become 
overwhelming.” This could easily lead to a very large signature tables which can lead 
to a high latency when searching for the correct event. 
Hogue & Carter (2006) also state that “the main limitation to stateful signatures is 
that maintaining state consumes memory resources on your IPS/IDS device. Usually, 
however, this is not a significant problem if the IPS product is designed to efficiently 
use its resources. If your IPS does not efficiently manage resources when maintaining 
state, then the large consumption of resources (such as memory and CPU) can lead to 
a slow response time, dropped packets, missed signatures, and so on, which adversely 
impacts the effectiveness of your IPS.” 
3.4 Snort and Suricata 
Snort and Suricata are both IPS software which can be found in commercial security 
solutions. Both can be deployed as IDS or IPS sensor in the network. 
Snort is an open source network intrusion prevention system (IPS) by Cisco. It is 
capable of performing real-time traffic analysis and packet logging on IP networks. It 
can perform protocol analysis, content searching and matching, and detect a variety 
of attacks and probes. Snort can be used as a straight packet sniffer like tcpdump, a 
packet logger (useful for network traffic debugging), or as a full-blown network 
intrusion prevention system. (Snort 2016) 
Three possible configuration modes for Snort are: 
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- Sniffer mode, which reads the packets off of the network and displays them in a 
continuous stream on the console (Snort 2016) 
- Packet Logger mode, which logs the packets to disk. (Snort 2016)  
- Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) mode, which performs detection and 
analysis on network traffic (Snort 2016) 
 
Snort also uses a concept of preprocessors, which allow the functionality of Snort to 
be extended by allowing users and programmers to drop modular plugins into Snort 
fairly easily. Preprocessor code is run before the detection engine is called, but after 
the packet has been decoded. The packet can be modified or analyzed in an out-of-
band manner using this mechanism. (Snort 2016). 
A good excample for a Snort preprocesssor would be the sfPortscan preprocessor. 
The sfPortscan module, developed by Sourcefire, is designed to detect the first phase 
in a network attack: Reconnaissance. (ibid.) In the Reconnaissance phase, an attacker 
determines what types of network protocols or services a host supports.  
Snort uses a simple description language. Snort rules are divided into two logical 
sections, the rule header and the rule options. The rule header contains the rule’s 
action, protocol, source and destination IP addresses and netmasks, and the source 
and destination ports. The rule option section contains alert messages and 
information on which parts of the packet should be inspected to determine if the 
rule action should be taken. (ibid.) Figure 5 presents a sample snort rule. 
 
Figure 5 A sample snort rule 
Snort can be considered as de facto standard in intrusion prevention and it is used by 
most of the security vendors to provide the intrusion prevention capabilities in their 
solutions. 
Suricata is a high-performance Network IDS, IPS and Network Security Monitoring 
engine. It is open source and owned by a community-run non-profit foundation, the 
Open Information Security Foundation (OISF). Suricata is developed by the OISF. 
(Suricata 2016) 
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Suricata implements a complete signature language to match on known threats, 
policy violations and malicious behavior. Suricata will also detect many anomalies in 
the traffic it inspects. Suricata is capable of using the specialized Emerging Threats 
Suricata ruleset and the VRT ruleset. (Suricata 2016) 
Suricata is natively multithreaded and therefore, a single Suricata instance is capable 
of inspecting multi-gigabit traffic.  
3.5 High performance intrusion prevention 
As the scale of the traffic flowing through IPS systems has increased rapidly over the 
years and the amount of different attacks is increasing, the IPS systems face a serious 
challenge in terms of detection rate and throughput. For example, a signature-based 
IPS, such as Snort, employs thousands of rules that contain intrusion patterns.  
Each Snort rule is divided into two logical sections: the rule header and the rule 
options. The rule header contains the rule's action and a classification filter that 
consists of five fixed fields: protocol, source IP address, source port, destination IP 
address, and destination port. The rule option contains alert messages and pattern 
information on how a packet payload should be inspected. (Panthan 2014) 
The results of the header classification identify the related rule options that will be 
checked in the follow-up deep packet inspection (DPI). Deep packet inspection is 
based on pattern matching, in which Snort employs two types of patterns: strings 
and regular expressions. Both header classification and deep packet inspection as the 
core functions of NIDS are computation-intensive, which has challenged the 
conventional computing architectures with demanding CPU, memory, and I/O 
requirements. (ibid.)  
When examining today's hardware techniques, we have general-purpose processors, 
such as CPUs (central processing units) and GPUs (graphics processing units), on one 
end of the spectrum and application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) on the other. 
(Panthan 2014) 
ASICs provide the best performance but require a complete and extremely expensive 
re-fabrication of the circuits. Fortunately, there exists some architecture between 
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these two extremes. Reconfigurable hardware, such as a field-programmable gate 
array (FPGA), offers the best of both worlds. Modern FPGAs provide superior 
performance, and they can be reprogrammed on the fly. (ibid) 
Hardware vise packet header classification can be approached with two different 
methods. Ternary content addressable memory (TCAM) is a specialized ASIC widely 
used in network search engines. Most of the existing multi-match packet 
classification engines are based on TCAMs in which each input performs a parallel 
search over all entries in one clock cycle, and only the first matching index is output. 
(ibid.) 
TCAMs are expensive and not scalable with respect to clock rate, power 
consumption, or circuit area, compared to static random access memories (SRAMs). 
As the rule set size increases rapidly, alternate hardware platforms are needed for 
multi-match packet classification engines. State-of-the-art SRAM-based field 
programmable gate array (FPGA) devices provide a high clock rate and a large 
amount of on-chip dual-port memory with configurable word width. It takes a few 
milliseconds to reconfigure an entire FPGA, and the update frequency of NIDS rules is 
on the order of days. Thus, FPGA has become an attractive platform for realizing real-
time network processing engines. (Panthan 2014) 
The functions of NIDS rely on multi-pattern string matching, which scans the input 
stream to find all occurrences of a predefined set of string-based patterns rather 
than a single pattern. Due to the explosive growth of network traffic, multi-pattern 
string matching has been a major performance bottleneck in NIDS, which has to scan 
the incoming traffic in real time on fast links (e.g., 100 Gbps Ethernet and beyond). 
For example, it has been reported that the string matching time accounts for 40% to 
70% of the Snort running time. Simple and efficient hardware-based multi-pattern 
string matching engines have become a necessity for high-speed NIDS. (ibid.) 
String matching has been a classic problem for decades. According to the 
implementation platform, the state-of-the-art solutions can be generally divided into 
three categories: multi-core processor–based, application-specific integrated circuit 
(ASIC)–based, and field programmable gate array (FPGA) based solutions. Each of the 
three hardware solutions has its own pros and cons. (Panthan 2014) 
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Advanced multi-core processor based solutions can improve the aggregate 
throughput dramatically by using a large number of threads to process multiple input 
streams in parallel. On the other hand, it has been observed that the memory access 
pattern in string matching is irregular. This results in relatively low per-stream 
throughput, which is critical for real-time network traffic processing. Although it is 
possible to split an input stream into several sub-streams with partial overlap among 
the sub-streams, additional complexity is introduced in scheduling, buffering, and 
ordering. (ibid.) 
ASIC–based solutions provide impressively high per-stream throughput while their 
applicability is limited by the high implementation cost and low reprogrammability. 
Combining the flexibility of software and the near-ASIC performance, FPGA 
technology has become an attractive option for implementing high-performance 
string matching engines. (ibid.) 
Regular expression (regex) matching is an important mechanism used by modern IPS, 
such as Snort to perform deep packet inspection against potential threats. Due to the 
large number of patterns to scan for and the increasing bandwidth of network traffic, 
regular expression matching is becoming not just a bottleneck but itself a 
vulnerability of the NIDS. (Panthan 2014) 
Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) have been widely used to secure the 
networks. However, the performance of NIDS must be capable of catching up with 
the explosive growth of network traffic to prevent the NIDS itself becoming the 
target of attacks. The core functions of modern NIDS include multi-match packet 
classification and deep packet inspection, which is based on multi-pattern string 
matching and regular expression matching. These functions are computation-
intensive, especially when the size of the NIDS rule set is large. This has challenged 
conventional computing architectures with demanding CPU, memory, and I/O 
requirements. Dedicated hardware accelerators become a necessity to address these 
challenges. (Panthan 2014) 
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4 Test scenario 
In the test phase, the solutions under test are flooded with network traffic. This 
traffic simulates the normal network traffic flowing through the devices every day in 
live networks. When the overall system load level is near maximum for each solution, 
malicious traffic is added into the traffic pattern. This simulates the situation where 
an attacker may try to overwhelm the security device to bypass the system exploiting 
the congestion algorithms applied in high load situations. 
The BreakingPoint test environment consists of Ixia virtual controller, virtual blade 
and a virtual test switch. Virtual controller performs the management functions for 
the test environment. Virtual blade is attached to the controller and provides the 
actual functionalities in the test environment such as traffic generation. Virtual 
switch is used as a control channel between the virtual controller and the virtual 
blade and it also functions as a connection point for physical devices under the test. 
Figure 6 presents an example deployment scenario of the BreakingPoint test tool.  
 
Figure 6 BreakingPoint VE deployment for both virtual and physical device tests (Ixia) 
The test environment consists of Ixia BreakingPoint solution virtualized in VMware 
environment. The tested systems are deployed between the Breaking point using 
two network interfaces which are used as source and destination for the simulated 
traffic. Figure 7 presents VMware environment’s virtual networking for 
BreakingPoint.  
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Figure 7 VMware virtual networking in test environment 
The virtual controller software is deployed as open virtualization format template  
(OVF) on a VMware host. After the deployment, the virtual blade is deployed using 
the controller software. Figure 8 presents the virtual blade deployment process. 
 
Figure 8 Virtual blade deployment example 
After the deployment of the virtual blade, the BreakingPoint software can be 
launched from the virtual controller. Figure 9 shows the main page of the 
BreakingPoint software. 
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Figure 9 BreakingPoint main menu 
BreakingPoint test consists of two main components. These components are network 
neighborhood and test components. Network neighborhood includes the addressing 
rules available for each test interface. Network neighborhood has different 
components which break the neighborhood into a smaller subset which is combined 
with tags. As seen in Figure 10, the neighborhood used in the test has interface, 
router and host objects. 
 
Figure 10 Test environments virtual network neighborhood 
Interfaces are the interfaces of the virtual blade attached into the VMware virtual 
switch seen in Figure 8. Ipv4 router and ipv4 static hosts. The objects present the 
networks inside the virtual blade which are used for traffic generation. In the 
neighborhood shown in Figure 11, the generated traffic for tests is flowing from host 
network 10.10.0.0 /16 towards 10.11.0.0 /16 network where the simulated services 
reside.  
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Figure 11 Network neighborhood for tests 
 From the test components section two options are used for the tests. These options 
are application simulator and security. The application simulator defines the traffic 
pattern used to load down the devices under test. Security enables to include 
harmful traffic into the test pattern. 
The main parameters in the application simulator for the tests are application profile 
determining the traffic pattern and load profile determining the amount of traffic 
sent in different phases of the test.  
Two different BreakingPoint default application profiles were chosen for the tests, 
NGFW Enterprise Perimeter Traffic Mix 2016 seen in Figure 12 which emulates the 
enterprise perimeter protocol mix described in a 2016 Next Generation Firewall Test 
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Methodology report (BreakingPoint help).
 
Figure 12 NGFW Enterprise Perimeter Traffic Mix 2016 pattern  
IPS Core Traffic profile can be seen in Figure 13 where the traffic comprises protocols 
SSH, RSTP and SMTP (BreakingPoint help). According to Ixia, the IPS Core Traffic 
profile is ideally designed to test IPS systems. 
 
Figure 13 IPS Core Traffic pattern 
The load profile in the application simulator defines the behavior of traffic during the 
different phases of the test. In BreakingPoint, a load profile consists of three phases: 
ramp up, steady state and ramp down phase.  
In the ramp up phase the BreakingPoint system opens as many TCP connections as 
possible between the source and destination networks seen in Figure 11. The steady 
state is used to open and close the TCP sessions opened in the ramp up phase. 
Opened connections are used for the traffic generator to produce traffic for the test 
defined in the application profile. In the ramp down phase, TCP connections are 
closed and no new sessions are opened. Table 2 shows the selected values for the 
tests. Appendix 1,2 and 3 describe variables available for the load profile phases. 
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Table 2 BreakingPoint load profile settings. 
Parameter Description Valid values Description 
Ramp Up Behavior 
Sets how the 
component will 
handle sessions 
during different test 
phases 
Full Open 
The full TCP handshake 
performed when sessions 
are opened. 
Steady-State 
Behavior 
Open and Close 
Sessions 
Sessions are closed as 
they finish sending data, 
and new sessions are 
opened. 
Ramp Down Behavior Full Close 
The full TCP session close 
is performed. 
    
The security section defines the malicious traffic used in tests. A premade strike list, 
which houses the number of strikes is used. Additionally, any advanced IPS evasion is 
not used in order to simplify the tests. A strike list named Strike Level 1 – 2017 
includes 21 strikes from year 2017 with CVSS score 10.0. This strike list is used 
against the devices under test. 
A single strike which the tested IPS system can block is also used. This strike is chosen 
per device basis. The strike lists have a delayed start of 10 seconds, which gives the 
load profile enough time to ramp up the simulated traffic. 
Many more advanced parameters are available in the BreakingPoint test system. 
These options are outside the scope of this research because the research focuses 
mainly on the IPS performance. For every tested device, a certain point of where the 
device cannot handle the traffic must be determined before the test with the 
malicious traffic can be performed. Otherwise, the high load scenario cannot be 
reached.  
The problem with reaching the high load scenario was solved by high over 
subscripting the amount of traffic in the test network. The number of virtual hosts 
and services was set way too high for the system under the test to handle, which 
caused the system load of the tested system to rise high enough so that the tests 
could be executed.   
It was also considered how to perform the over subscripting. If the focus was only on 
raising the amount of TCP connections through the tested system, the traffic drops 
would became totally random as the device runs out of memory. Instead of a high 
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amount of connections, the volume of traffic in megabytes was set as the major 
component. 
5 System tests  
The total of three different systems were tested during the test period. The systems 
including snort intrusion prevention system were Sophos UTM firewall and Cisco ASA 
Firepower 5506 firewall. Suricata intrusion prevention system was included in 
OPNsense system which is a fork from PFSense open source firewall.  
5.1 Test scenario 
The first test run included only attacks from Strike Level 1 – 2017 attack pack without 
any background traffic. The purpose of the test was to set a base line in how many 
attacks the target device was able to prevent. Some of the attacks had many 
iterations so the total number of attacks in the tests was 210 
The second test run combined the Strike Level 1 – 2017 attack pack with NGFW 
Enterprise Perimeter Traffic Mix 2016 traffic pattern and the third test used IPS Core 
Traffic pattern with Strike Level 1 – 2017 attack pack. The fourth test included only 
one attack which the device under test was able to detect combined with IPS Core 
Traffic pattern. 
IPS process CPU utilization was monitored with “top” command. In Sophos UTM and 
OPNsense it was possible to monitor the IPS process CPU usage continuously; 
however, in Cisco Asa Firepower the top command had no options for continuous 
monitoring and therefore, the exact utilization of the IPS process could not be 
obtained. Figure 14 shows an example of a top output from Cisco Asa Firepower. 
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Figure 14 Top command output from Cisco ASA Firepower 
5.2 Sophos UTM  
Sophos UTM firewall is a security solution from Sophos including all required 
capabilities for a next generation firewall. Sophos UTM also extends the protection 
into email and web application areas. Sophos UTM houses Snort IPS solution.  
Sophos UTM with software version 9.505-4 includes Snort version 2.9.9.0. The total 
of XX signatures were loaded into the Snort engine in the test setup. Hardware wise 
UTM model 110 has Intel Atom CPU N450 with clock rate at 1.66GHz and 8 gigabytes 
of RAM. Sophos datasheet promises IPS throughput up to 140 Mbps (Sophos 2012). 
Figure 15 presents the results from the first test. A total of 210 attacks were 
executed where 180 of them were allowed and 30 were blocked by the Sophos UTM.  
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Figure 15 Sophos UTM first test detection rate 
In total Sophos UTM was able to block 14.29% of the executed attacks and 85.71% of 
the attacks were allowed during the first test run. Appendix 4 shows the detailed 
strike category assessment of the first test. Detection rate can be considered quite 
low as the Strike Level 1 – 2017 attack pack includes strikes from year 2017 with 
CVSS score 10.0. This is caused by the fact mentioned by Hogue & Carter (2006) that 
“if your IPS does not efficiently manage resources when maintaining state, then the 
large consumption of resources (such as memory and CPU) can lead to a slow 
response time, dropped packets, missed signatures, and so on, which adversely 
impacts the effectiveness of your IPS.” As the number of required signatures is too 
high for the available hardware to handle the IPS manufactures have to reduce the 
amount of signature loaded into the memory which then leads to reduced detection 
rates in low end devices. 
In the second test, Sophos UTM was able to block 28% of the executed attack and 
72% of the attacks were allowed during the test run. One of the attacks failed due to 
an error as seen in Figure 16. Appendix 5 includes the detailed strike category 
assessments.  
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Figure 16 Sophos UTM second test detection rate 
The average throughput of the device was around 50Mb/s and the throughput 
stayed solid throughout the test run. When compared to the figures promised in 
Sophos UTM datasheet with IPS throughput of 140Mb/s, it can be concluded that IPS 
core traffic profile of the Ixia BreakingPoint causes an extreme load to the IPS 
systems. Figure 17 presents the throughput of the Sophos UTM throughout the 
second test run.  
 
Figure 17 Sophos UTM second test throughput 
Table 3 presents the detailed frame and application transaction analysis of the 
second test. From Table 3 it can be noted that the 12 percent of the application 
transaction failed due to the TCP retry limit, which indicates that the test profile 
combined with the test environment was causing too many TCP connections through 
the Sophos UTM. Additionally, quite many transactions failed because of the resolve 
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receive timeout, which implies that the UTM was not able to pass all of the DNS 
requests from the virtual client side into the virtual server side. Appendix 7 displays 
the Snort process CPU load throughout the second test.  
Table 3 Sophos UTM second test frame analysis  
Measurement Value 
Frames transmitted 4 593 365 
Frames received 4 088 960   
Frame data transmitted 3 704 366 
Frame data received 3 067 328  
Attempted 8277 
Aborted 0 
Successes 5474 
Failures due to external events 187 
Failures due to ramp down 933 
Failures due to TCP retry limit 1019 
Failures due to UDP receive timeout 61 
Failures due to resolve receive timeout 787 
 
In the third test, Sophos UTM was able to block 14% of the executed attacks and 86% 
of the attacks were allowed during the test run. Appendix 8 shows the detailed strike 
category assessment of the third test. Figure 18 presents the detection rate of the 
third test run.
 
Figure 18 Sophos UTM third test detection rate 
The throughput of the third test was slightly lower, around 30Mb/s when compared 
to the 50Mb/s in the second test run. The result is somewhat surprising due to the 
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fact that the NGFW Enterprise Perimeter Traffic Mix 2016 used in the third test 
should be much lighter for the IPS systems than the IPS Core Traffic pattern used in 
the second test. Figure 19 presents the throughput of the Sophos UTM during the 
third test. 
 
 
Figure 19 Sophos UTM third test throughput 
The frame and application transaction analysis in Table 4 shows that no major 
failures occured during the third test. For example, when comparing the failures due 
to the TCP retry limit in to the second test, the rate is only 0.23%. Appendix 9 
displays the application transaction summary from the third test. The Snort process 
CPU load remained extremely high throughout the third test which is presented in 
Appendix 10. 
Table 4 Sophos UTM third test frame analysis 
Measurement Value 
Frames transmitted 8 444 524 
Frames received 8 386 884   
Frame data transmitted 4 991 969 277 
Frame data received 4 974 163 265   
Attempted 110 477 
Aborted 0 
Successes 109 328 
Failures due to external events 279 
Failures due to ramp down 870 
Failures due to TCP retry limit 10 
Failures due to UDP receive timeout 7 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0
,0
0
4
2
,4
3
5
8
1
,4
3
5
1
2
7
,4
3
4
1
8
0
,4
3
4
2
2
6
,4
3
4
2
7
2
,4
3
4
3
2
4
,4
3
4
3
7
0
,4
3
4
4
0
9
,4
3
4
4
5
5
,4
3
3
5
0
8
,4
3
2
5
6
0
,4
3
3
6
0
6
,4
3
2
6
5
2
,4
3
2
6
9
8
,4
3
3
7
4
4
,4
3
3
7
9
0
,4
3
3
8
3
6
,4
3
2
8
8
8
,4
3
1
9
4
1
,4
3
2
9
8
7
,4
3
1
1
,0
2
6
,4
3
2
1
,0
7
2
,4
3
2
1
,1
2
4
,4
3
2
1
,1
7
0
,4
3
7
1
,2
1
6
,4
3
7
1
,2
6
9
,4
3
6
1
,3
1
5
,4
3
7
1
,3
5
4
,4
3
6
1
,4
0
0
,4
3
7
1
,4
4
6
,4
3
7
1
,4
9
8
,4
3
7
1
,5
4
4
,4
3
6
M
eg
ab
it
s 
/ 
s
Timestamp (seconds)
Transmit megabit rate Receive megabit rate
34 
 
 
Failures due to resolve receive timeout 250 
Failures due to a premature session close 0 
Failures due to a premature Super Flow close 12 
 
For the fourth test, a CVE-2017-5689 vulnerability where an unprivileged network 
attacker could gain system privileges to provisioned Intel manageability SKUs: Intel 
Active Management Technology (AMT) and Intel Standard Manageability (ISM) was 
run ten times against Sophos UTM. Figure 20 presents the result where it can be 
seen that the Sophos UTM was able to prevent all ten attacks. 
 
 
Figure 20 Sophos UTM fourth test detection rate 
5.3 Cisco ASA Firepower 5506 
Cisco Asa Firepower is a new next generation firewall platform from Cisco. ASA5506-
X with FirePOWER Services combines Cisco’s proven network firewall with the 
industry’s most effective next-gen IPS and advanced malware protection (Cisco). ASA 
Firepower 5506 includes Snort IPS solution. 
Cisco ASA Firepower 5506 with software version 6.2.0.3 has snort version 2.9.11. A 
total of XX rules were loaded for the test scenario. Firewall has Atom C2000 series 
1250 MHz CPU with 4 cores and 4Gb of RAM. Cisco ASA Firepower 5506 datasheet 
shows combined AVC and IPS throughput to be 125 Mbps (Cisco). 
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Figure 21 presents results from the first test. A total of 210 attacks were executed 
where 171 of them were allowed and 39 were blocked by the Cisco Asa Firepower. 
 
Figure 21 Cisco Asa Firepower first test detection rate 
In total, Cisco Asa Firepower was able to block 18.57% of the executed attacks and 
81.4% of the attacks were allowed during the first test run. Appendix 11 shows the 
detailed strike category assessment of the first test. Low percentage in detection rate 
of the Cisco Asa Firepower shows that the amount of signatures is highly optimized 
also in Cisco product. 
In the second test, Cisco Asa Firepower was able to block 28% of the executed 
attacks and 72% of the attacks were allowed during the test run as seen in Figure 22. 
Appendix 12 includes the detailed strike category assessments. 
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Figure 22 Cisco Asa Firepower second test detection rate 
Figure 23 shows that the average throughput of the Cisco Asa Firepower was around 
50Mb/s and varied slightly throughout the test run. Cisco Asa Firepower 5506 
datasheet promises that the IPS throughput should be around 125Mb/s. 
 
Figure 23 Cisco Asa Firepower second test throughput 
Table 5 presents the detailed frame and application transaction analysis of the 
second test. Statistics in Table 5 shows that the major part of the failed application 
transactions during the second test was caused by the resolve receive timeout. For 
some reason, Cisco Asa Firepower was not able to pass the DNS requests from the 
virtual client side into the virtual server side of the test environment.  
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Table 5 Cisco Asa Firepower second test frame analysis  
Measurement Value 
Frames transmitted 573 215 
Frames received 467 745 
Frame data transmitted 83 165 881 
Frame data received 58 245 391   
Attempted 84 090 
Aborted 0 
Successes 30 555 
Failures due to external events 53 081 
Failures due to ramp down 454 
Failures due to TCP retry limit 12 666 
Failures due to UDP receive timeout 0 
Failures due to resolve receive timeout 40 415 
 
In total, 63% of the application transactions failed in the second test and 76% of the 
failures were caused by the resolve receive timeout behavior. Appendix 13 presents 
the summary of the second test application transactions.  
In the third test, Cisco Asa Firepower was able to block 28% of the executed attacks 
and 86% of the attacks were allowed during the test run. Appendix 14 shows the 
detailed strike category assessment of the third test. Figure 24 presents the 
detection rate of the third test run.
 
Figure 24 Cisco Asa Firepower third test detection rate 
The throughput shown in Figure 25 remains the same as in the second test, around 
50Mb/s. This is a major difference compared to the behavior of the Sophos UTM 
where the throughput between tests 2 and 3 had a difference. 
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Figure 25 Cisco Asa Firepower third test throughput 
The frame and application transaction analysis in Table 6 shows that the same 
behavior continues where the major part of the application transactions is failing due 
to the resolve receive timeout. Appendix 15 presents the summary of the third test 
application transactions. 
Table 6 Cisco Asa Firepower third test frame analysis  
Measurement Value 
Frames transmitted 6 841 219 
Frames received 6 805 521  
Frame data transmitted 3 375 612 266 
Frame data received 3 371 536 495  
Attempted 62 662 
Aborted 0 
Successes 27 888  
Failures due to external events 34 468  
Failures due to ramp down 306  
Failures due to TCP retry limit 7  
Failures due to UDP receive timeout 0 
Failures due to resolve receive timeout 34 461  
 
In the fourth test, a vulnerability MS17-010 where remote code execution 
vulnerabilities exist in the way that the Microsoft Server Message Block 1.0 (SMBv1) 
server handles certain requests was launched against Cisco Asa Firepower. An 
attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerabilities could gain the ability to 
execute code on the target server. Figure 26 presents the detection rate for test four.  
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Figure 26 Cisco Asa Firepower fourth test detection rate 
5.4 OPNsense 
OPNsense is an open source FreeBSD based firewall and routing platform. OPNsense 
includes most of the features available in expensive commercial firewalls. OPNsense 
started as a fork of pfSense® and m0n0wall in 2014, with its first official release in 
January 2015. (OPNSense) OPNsense is equipped with Suricata IPS solution for threat 
detection and analysis. 
OPNsense version OPNsense 17.7.7_1 includes Suricata version 4.0.1. A total of XX 
rules were loaded into the memory for the test scenarios. OPNsense is presented as 
a virtual firewall running in VMWare hypervisor where 1 CPU core and 8Gb of 
memory were allocated for the guest system. 
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Figure 27 presents the results from the first test. Total of 210 attacks were executed 
with 169 of them allowed and 41 blocked by the OPNsense. 
 
Figure 27 OPNsense first test detection rate 
In total, OPNsense was able to block 19.5% of the executed attacks and 80.5% of the 
attacks were allowed during the first test run. Appendix 16 shows the detailed strike 
category assessment of the first test. Also in OPNsense case the amount of IPS 
signatures has to be reduced in order to avoid heavy performance drop. 
Figure 28 shows that in the second test, OPNsense was able to block 48.5% of the 
executed attack and 51.5% of the attacks were allowed. Appendix 17 includes the 
detailed strike category assessments. 
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Figure 28 OPNsense second test detection rate 
As illustrated in Figure 29, a major difference can be seen between the transmitted 
and received megabit rate in the second test run. 
 
 
Figure 29 OPNsense second test throughput 
Table 7 confirms the findings presented in Figure 29. Over half of the transmitted 
frames are not received by the BreakingPpoint tool through the virtual test networks. 
According to the Table 7, application transactions are failing with multiple clauses, 
which is a significant difference when compared to the Cisco Asa Firepower tests 
where a single cause of the transaction failures was detected. In the application 
transactions summary in Appendix 18, it can be seen that OPNsense struggles with 
HTTP and DNS traffic. Suricata process CPU load remained high throughout the 
second test as seen in Appendix 19. 
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Table 7 OPNsense second test frame analysis 
Measurement Value 
Frames transmitted 6 470 367 
Frames received 2 893 187  
Frame data transmitted 5 677 871 194 
Frame data received 2 985 615 717  
Attempted 82 347 
Aborted 0 
Successes 53 716  
Failures due to external events 28 154  
Failures due to ramp down 477  
Failures due to TCP retry limit 15 343  
Failures due to UDP receive timeout 100  
Failures due to resolve receive timeout 12 603  
Failures due to a premature session close 0 
Failures due to a premature Super Flow 
close 99  
General application failures 9  
 
Figure 30 shows the detection rate in the third test run. OPNsense was able to block 
41% of the attacks and allowed 59% of the attacks. The difference between the 
second and third test in blocked attacs is 15.5%. Appendix 20 includes the detailed 
strike category assessments. 
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Figure 30 OPNsense third test detection rate 
Figure 31 and Table 8 confirm that similar behavior where there is a major difference 
between transmitted and received frames continues also in test run 3.  Again, diverse 
causes of failures are seen in application transactions failures. 
 
Figure 31 OPNsense third test throughput 
Appendix 21 shows that most application transaction failures come from HTTP, 
HTTPS and DNS traffic. CPU load of the Suricata process seen in Appendix 22 shows 
similar behavior when compared to the second test. 
Table 8 OPNsense third test frame analysis  
Measurement Value 
Frames transmitted 5 467 345 
Frames received 2 955 998  
Frame data transmitted 3 954 431 188 
Frame data received 2 563 138 737  
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Attempted 81 058 
Aborted 0 
Successes 54 336  
Failures due to external events 26 714  
Failures due to ramp down 530  
Failures due to TCP retry limit 11 982  
Failures due to UDP receive timeout 34  
Failures due to resolve receive timeout 12 285  
Failures due to a premature session close 0 
Failures due to a premature Super Flow 
close 2413  
5.5 Conclusion 
Initial detection rates provided by the first test showed that each of the tested 
systems was able to detect an almost similar amount of malicious traffic where 
Sophos UTM blocked 30 attacks, Cisco ASA Firepower blocked 39 and OPNsense was 
able to block 41 attacks. These results are a good example of the problem in high 
speed intrusion detection where the number of signatures must remain low. 
Otherwise the performance requirements of the hardware platform would not be 
cost effective. Panthan (2014) also addresses this problem saying that “Dedicated 
hardware accelerators become a necessity to address these challenges.” However 
especially in low end devices such option is not often available.   
The difference in the detection rates increased when IPS Core and NGFW traffic 
patterns were added into the test scenario. Also, the way with which the devices 
under the test handled the background traffic provided by the patterns showed 
some major differences. 
Sophos UTM was proven to be the most solid contender when comparing the 
handling of the background traffic in a high load situation. When looking at the frame 
analysis in Table 3, no single cause of the application transaction failure can be 
distinguished. With IPS Core traffic pattern, the detection rate rose to 58; however, 
with NGFW traffic pattern the detection rate decreased back to 30 attacks. The 
better detection rate in test number two is probably caused by the device dropping 
the traffic before inspecting as with the more lighter traffic profile in test three, the 
detection rate lowered back to the baseline.  
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Cisco ASA Firepower showed some strange behavior with traffic patterns as a major 
part of the application transactions were failing because of the DNS resolve timeout 
as seen in Tables 5 and 6. An error message “interface br0 lost contact” was 
observed during the tests two and three in the management console of the devices, 
which leads to the suspicion that some other processing or component before the 
actual Snort process was limiting the throughput of the traffic. This assumption was 
even more confirmed when the manufacturer community forums were able to prove 
that the ASA Firepower 5506 has two modules, plain firewall side and IPS side 
connected together by an internal bridge interface (Cisco Community). Therefore, 
Cisco ASA 5506 tests cannot be considered a success. 
OPNsense was a leading contender in test 1 with 41 blocked attacks. When adding 
the background traffic in tests 2 and 3, the detection rates increased even more. As it 
can be seen from the data provided by the tests 2 and 3, OPNSense had major 
problems when it comes to the handling of the traffic passing through the device. 
Figure 29 of test 2 and Figure 31 of test 3 show that over half of the traffic was either 
not passed through the device or erred in some way during the transit. Especially the 
handling of the HTTP based streaming content was proven to be a major problem for 
the Suricata IPS in OPNsense platform. Since over half of the traffic was dropped by 
the device, the higher detection rates cannot be considered to be valid and they 
were probably just randomly dropped.   
In the case of the Sophos UTM and OPNsense, the CPU load of the IPS process was 
successfully raised near the 100% throughout the tests. With Cisco Asa Firepower, an 
internal bridge interface connecting the IPS and firewall side was limiting the traffic 
reaching the IPS process. This led to the situation where the IPS load in Cisco Asa 
Firepower was not high enough to provide a fair comparison with other tested 
systems. 
Overall the results of the test scenarios cannot be considered accurate enough for a 
proper conclusion about the IPS detection rates in high load scenario. Only Sophos 
UTM test results reach such confidence level where a proper conclusion level that 
the detection rate of the snort IPS solution built in the device is not affected by the 
extremely high system load. Other devices under the test had major issues with 
handling of the background traffic, which rendered the results unusable. 
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6 Discussion 
 The goal of the research was to study if a high system load of an IPS system affects 
the detection rate of the malicious traffic passing through the system. Additionally, 
the research was thought to present a scenario where a possible attacker could 
benefit from the high load scenario caused by, for example, a denial of service attack. 
The devices under the research were chosen based on the IPS solution and not by 
the manufacturer. One open source product was chosen to provide a comparison 
between commercial and free solutions. As most of the commercial products rely on 
a Snort solution for IPS functionality, the open source product OPNsense was chosen 
as it relies on Suricata IPS solution. The device models were deliberately selected 
from the low end of the product catalogs so that the high load scenario could be 
easily achieved.   
Ixia BreakingPoint tool used to test the devices proved to be a comprehensive tool 
for such tests as it was able to provide the background traffic as well as malicious 
traffic. Ixia-made traffic patterns and attack patterns were chosen to keep the test 
setup simple enough as the Ixia tool has quite many options to tweak, for example 
the amount or type of the malicious traffic has over 20 options. 
The first problem which arose during the testing was the diversity of the background 
network traffic. For example, the traffic could be using a high amount of connections 
with relatively low bandwidth or vice versa. This led to the problem of sizing the 
correct amount of traffic so that the device would experience a high load but in the 
meantime, keep the connection rate low enough so that the device would not run 
out of memory.  Ixia calls the point where the device under the test is not able to 
handle the traffic a breaking point. The researcher believes that with more accurate 
breaking point sizing, the results would be more accurate. 
The second problem observed during the tests was the amount of IPS signatures 
loaded into each of the devices. The more loaded signatures, the easier it was to 
saturate the IPS process in the device. A decision was made to keep the number of 
signatures on default setting in each of the device. This led to an uneven amount of 
signatures between the tested devices. 
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The third major problem observed during testing was the difference in results 
between the BreakingPoint tool and the tested system. In many cases, the IPS system 
would report the malicious traffic as blocked; however, the BreakingPoint tool 
reported a successful attack. A comprehensive comparison between the test tool 
reporting and IPS system reporting would have probably fined the detection rate 
results in the research.  
Overall, the research produced quite mixed results. Only one of the tested solutions, 
Sophos UTM was able to give solid results as Cisco ASA Firepower failed to deliver 
the traffic into Snort process and OPNsense’s Suricata was unable to handle HTTP 
based streams. Additionally, the complexity of the background traffic patterns and 
IPS signatures caused the test scenario to easily become too complex to handle in 
the scope of the research.  
Further analysis should concentrate on providing a more accurate breaking point of 
the tested devices. Also, a more detailed look should be taken into the background 
traffic profiles and IPS signature patters loaded into the memory of the devices.  
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Appendice 
Appendix 1. Load profile values for Ramp Up Behavior 
Parameter Description Valid values Description 
Ramp Up 
Behavior 
Sets how the 
component will 
open sessions 
during the ramp up 
phase. 
Full Open 
The full TCP handshake performed when 
sessions are opened. 
Full Open + Data  
The full TCP handshake performed when 
sessions are opened. Data sent once the 
session opens. 
Full Open + Data + Full Close 
The full TCP handshake performed when 
sessions are opened. Data sent once the 
session opens. Sessions are closed as they 
finish sending data and new sessions are 
opened in their place. 
Full Open + Data + Close with 
Reset 
The full TCP handshake performed when 
sessions are opened. Data sent once the 
session opens. A TCP close with a RST is 
initiated and the TCP close state machine is 
bypassed. 
Half Open 
The full TCP handshake performed when 
sessions are opened, but the final ACK is 
omitted. 
SYN Only Only SYN packets are sent. 
Data Only 
Only PSH data packets are sent. The state 
machine is bypassed, so no connections are 
set up; therefore, the ACKs will be invalid. 
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Appendix 2. Load profile values for Steady-State Behavior 
Parameter Description Valid values Description 
Steady-State 
Behavior 
Sets how the 
component will 
handle sessions 
during the 
steady-state 
phase. 
Open and Close Sessions 
Sessions are closed as they finish sending 
data, and new sessions are opened. 
Hold Sessions Open 
No existing sessions opened during Ramp 
Up are closed. 
Open and Close with Reset 
A TCP close with a RST is initiated and the 
TCP close state machine is bypassed 
Open and Close with Reset 
Response 
Once a session is closed, the server will 
respond with a RST and change to the TCP 
CLOSED state. This option bypasses the TCP 
TIME_WAIT state. 
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Appendix 3. Load profile values for Ramp Down Behavor 
Parameter Description Valid values Description 
Ramp Down 
Behavior 
Sets how the component will 
close sessions during the time 
period specified for Ramp 
Down Duration 
Full Close The full TCP session close is performed. 
Half Close 
The full TCP session close is performed, but 
the final ACK is omitted 
Reset  
Close all sessions by sending TCP RST (reset) 
packets. 
Reset 
Response 
Open and Close with Reset Response  
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Appendix 4. Sophos UTM first test detailed detailed strike category 
assessment 
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Appendix 5. Sophos UTM second test detailed strike category 
assessment 
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Appendix 6. Sophos UTM second test application transactions 
summary 
 
Protocol Success (Transactions) Failure (Transactions) 
RTP 147 0 
SMTP 16 46 
RTCP 147 0 
DNS 2896 787 
RPC NFSv3 35 1 
SIP 145 8 
PostgreSQL 27 73 
NetBIOS 177 98 
HTTP 1128 723 
SSH 0 1 
AOL Instant 
Messenger 10 8 
SMB 184 34 
RPC BIND (Portmap) 176 31 
RTSP 13 3 
FTP 9 0 
DCE RPC 299 27 
RPC MOUNT 65 30 
 
 
 
 
 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Success (Transactions) Failure (Transactions)
56 
 
 
Appendix 7. Sophos UTM second test snort CPU load 
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Appendix 8. Sophos UTM third test detailed detailed strike category 
assessment 
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Appendix 9. Sophos UTM third test application transactions summary 
 
Protocol 
Success 
(Transactions) Failure (Transactions) 
Google Talk 145 13 
SMTP 5163 1 
DNS 29 126 250 
Raw 21 0 
Yahoo Mail 2856 0 
Gmailclassic 205 0 
HTTP 3493 0 
Twitter 38 094 1 
HTTPS Simulated 1499 0 
Facebook 417 0 
Youtube October 2011 
(Deprecated) 264 0 
AOL Instant Messenger 20 119 7 
Classic STUN 4489 7 
FTP 1637 0 
Amazon S3 4 0 
BitTorrent Peer 491 0 
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Appendix 10. Sophos UTM third test snort CPU load 
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Appendix 11. Cisco Asa Firepower first test detailed strike category 
assessment 
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Appendix 12. Cisco Asa Firepower second test detailed strike category 
assessment 
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Appendix 13. Cisco Asa Firepower second test application transactions 
summary 
 
Protocol 
Success 
(Transactions) 
Failure 
(Transactions) 
RTP 600 0 
SMTP 7 0 
RTCP 600 0 
DNS 31 40 415 
RPC NFSv3 591 0 
PostgreSQL 2 0 
NetBIOS 10 421 0 
HTTP 9 13 
SSH 118 0 
AOL Instant 
Messenger 1291 0 
SMB 1105 10 273 
RPC BIND (Portmap) 1182 0 
RTSP 3 0 
DCE RPC 0 238 
RPC MOUNT 591 0 
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Appendix 14. Cisco Asa Firepower third test detailed strike category 
assessment 
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Appendix 15. Cisco Asa Firepower third test application transactions 
summary 
 
Protocol 
Success 
(Transactions) 
Failure 
(Transactions) 
SMTP 6 0 
Google Talk 77 0 
DNS 57 34 461 
Raw 9 0 
Yahoo Mail 12 0 
Twitter 44 0 
HTTP 2488 7 
HTTPS Simulated 16 0 
Facebook 715 0 
BitTorrent Peer 2954 0 
AOL Instant 
Messenger 14 157 0 
Classic STUN 238 0 
FTP 7115 0 
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Appendix 16. OPNsense first test detailed strike category assessment 
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Appendix 17. OPNsense second test detailed strike category assessment 
 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Strikes Blocked Strikes Passed Strikes Errored Strikes Skipped Strikes False Positive Blocked
67 
 
 
Appendix 18. OPNsense second test application transactions summary 
 
Protocol 
Success 
(Transactions) 
Failure 
(Transactions) 
RTP 348 0 
SMTP 1226 1627 
RTCP 339 0 
DNS 15 819 12 603 
RPC NFSv3 32 22 
SIP 38 29 
PostgreSQL 911 1381 
NetBIOS 5188 824 
HTTP 2119 7047 
SSH 289 340 
AOL Instant 
Messenger 538 297 
SMB 21 575 3285 
RPC BIND 
(Portmap) 526 2 
RTSP 1734 124 
FTP 1452 267 
DCE RPC 1438 208 
RPC MOUNT 144 98 
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Appendix 19. OPNsense second test suricata CPU load 
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Appendix 20. OPNsense third test detailed strike category assessment 
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Appendix 21. OPNsense third test application transactions summary 
 
Protocol 
Success 
(Transactions) 
Failure 
(Transactions) 
Google Talk 2275 2068 
SMTP 2447 1529 
DNS 21 389 12 285 
Raw 0 4 
Yahoo Mail 5058 1819 
Gmailclassic 4 123 
HTTP 1164 1212 
Twitter 678 81 
HTTPS Simulated 2771 1214 
Facebook 165 499 
Youtube October 
2011 (Deprecated) 169 169 
AOL Instant 
Messenger 9874 3774 
Classic STUN 4122 34 
FTP 3764 632 
Amazon S3 110 260 
BitTorrent Peer 346 1011 
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Appendix 22. OPNSense third test suricata CPU load 
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